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The new carbon levy of $30 per tonne, announced in November 2015 as part of the report 
issued by the Alberta government’s Climate Leadership Panel, is a positive move in the direction 
of pricing carbon emissions. The levy is expected to generate $3 billion in net revenue by 2018, 
and possibly as much as $5 billion by 2030.  While there is some discussion in the report of 
what should be done with the revenues generated by the carbon levy, it is somewhat vague 
on the details, leaving a number of options open to the government. The purpose of this 
briefing paper is to argue that the revenues from the carbon levy should be used to lower 
existing taxes – the carbon tax should be revenue neutral, generating no new net revenue for 
the government.
The basic argument is that the carbon levy can be viewed through two lenses. The first lens 
is the imposition of a price on carbon emissions which (at least partly) reflects the social 
costs of emissions. Viewed through this price lens, the carbon levy plays an important role 
in incenting firms and individuals to change their behaviour and move towards less carbon 
intensive activities. The second lens is the role of a carbon tax as a part of the broad revenue 
system. Viewed through this tax lens, a carbon tax is not a very good, or efficient, way of 
generating revenue. The reason for this is somewhat nuanced, but the basic idea is that 
the carbon tax is applied to a narrower base than broader-based taxes. Broad based taxes 
generally impose lower costs on the economy than narrow based taxes. Moreover, carbon 
taxes interact with other taxes in the economy, exacerbating the economic costs associated 
with those taxes. And those costs are quite high – research shows that the total cost to the 
economy of raising an additional $1 in revenue through the corporate income tax in Alberta is 
$3.79; for the personal income tax the cost is $1.71. These taxes therefore impose higher costs 
on the economy than they raise in revenue. Swapping revenue from the carbon levy for these 
taxes in a revenue neutral manner would lower these costs, generating a substantial return to 
the provincial economy relative to other uses.
If the government wants to fund other priority areas – be it public infrastructure, investment 
in complementary initiatives to reduce emissions, or even deficit reduction – it is better to 
finance these initiatives through more efficient and less costly taxes than a carbon tax. The 
basic approach advocated here is as follows: price emissions appropriately by way of a carbon 
levy, use the revenue to reduce existing taxes in a revenue-neutral manner, evaluate the 
benefits of spending money on other initiatives, and finance those initiatives using the least 
costly configuration of taxes possible (subject to equity considerations).
1On Nov. 20, 2015 the Alberta Climate Leadership Panel released its much-anticipated 
report. A key recommendation of the report is the implementation of carbon pricing in 
Alberta. While the precise details of the pricing regime are somewhat complicated, the 
headline number is the introduction of a carbon levy of $30 per tonne by 2018.1
The report indicates that the carbon levy will generate approximately $3 billion in net 
revenue by 2018, potentially rising to $5 billion by 2030. While there is some discussion of 
what should be done with the revenues the carbon levy generates, the report is somewhat 
vague on the details, leaving a number of options open to the government. The purpose of 
this communiqué is to argue that the revenues from the carbon levy should be used to lower 
existing taxes – the carbon tax should be revenue neutral, generating no new net revenue for 
the government.2 
It is useful to begin by briefly stating the perhaps obvious case for imposing a carbon-
pricing scheme in the first place, which I fully support. Carbon emissions generate 
externalities, the most obvious being climate change, that are not appropriately reflected 
in the price of carbon-based fuels. By not appropriately reflected, I mean that the market 
price of carbon-based energy does not reflect the social costs associated with the resulting 
externalities. In the case of climate change, these costs include things like decreasing 
agricultural output, harm to human health, lower productivity, and costs associated with 
increased storm activity, droughts, etc. Market-determined carbon-based energy prices 
are therefore too low, and emissions are too high, because they do not reflect these social 
costs. Pricing carbon emissions to reflect the social costs is intended to curb the overuse of 
carbon-based energy and reduce emissions accordingly.3
Concisely summarizing what follows, I argue that policy should generally reflect the 
following approach: price emissions appropriately to reflect the associated externalities, 
use the revenue to reduce existing taxes in a revenue-neutral manner, evaluate the benefits 
of spending money on other initiatives (complementary emission reduction policies, 
infrastructure, deficit reduction, etc.), and finance those initiatives using the most efficient 
configuration of taxes possible (subject to equity considerations).
THE PROPOSED ALBERTA CARBON LEVY
The report makes several recommendations intended to lower, or at least stem, carbon 
emissions in Alberta. The emphasis here, and in much of the public discussion, is on the 
proposed carbon-pricing regime, referred to in the report as the carbon competitiveness 
1 
The report recommends that the levy be increased by inflation plus two per cent annually, with the caveat that “similar 
prices exist in peer and competitor jurisdictions.” Alberta Climate Leadership Panel report, 6. 
2 
In a paper for the Ecofiscal Commission (McKenzie, 2016), I make the case for revenue neutrality more generally. Here, I 
focus on Alberta. I borrow heavily from the analysis in that paper here. 
3 
Estimates of the efficient carbon tax rate vary widely, and it is not my intention to undertake a comprehensive survey of the 
research here. To get an idea of the range, consider that the U.S. Office of Management and Budget’s official estimate for 
the social cost of CO2 from climate change in 2015 is $37 per tonne, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/11/01/refining-
estimates-social-cost-carbon, while a recent Stanford University study pegged the cost at more than six times higher, at 
$220 per tonne (Moore and Diaz, 2015).
2regulation (CCR).4 While the core of the policy proposal has been referred to in the media 
as a carbon tax, the report does not in fact use the term, preferring the broader phrase 
“carbon levy,” or, more precisely, if not somewhat cryptically, “carbon pricing with output-
based allocations.” While the details of the CCR are important, and merit in-depth analysis, 
that is for another time; here, my focus is on the use of the revenues generated by the 
proposed regime. However, it is useful to set the stage with a brief overview of the approach 
to carbon pricing recommended in the report.
The report indicates that the carbon levy will generate approximately $3 billion in net 
revenue for the government. The word “net” is important; we must distinguish between the 
gross and net revenues generated by the levy. As indicated above, the recommendation calls 
for carbon pricing with sector-specific output-based allocations. The sector-specific output-
based allocations refer to the allocation of emission permits to large industrial emitters 
(greater than 100,000 tonnes per year) on the basis of their emissions intensity (emissions 
per unit of output) relative to a prescribed performance standard intensity. Large emitters 
include the usual list of suspects, such as oil sands operations, upgrading, refining, and 
electricity generators, but also petrochemical and fertilizer operations, cement plants and 
other large industrial operations. The output-based allocations are intended to reduce the 
average carbon price paid by these large emitters to address concerns about the impact 
of the carbon levy on the competitiveness of trade-exposed sectors, protect electricity 
consumers from large price increases, and to allay concerns about carbon leakage due to 
large current and future emitters abandoning the province to produce (both output and 
emissions) elsewhere. 
As indicated, the allocations to large emitters are to be based on carbon emissions per unit 
of output relative to a prescribed performance standard. Without going into the details 
of the scheme, the carbon-pricing regime faced by these large industrial emitters can be 
thought of as a broad-based carbon levy on their emissions coupled with an implicit per unit 
of output subsidy. Some large emitters with low carbon intensity may actually receive more 
in subsidy than they pay in carbon levy.
The output subsidy for large industrial emitters implicit in the CCR raises several issues  
which will not be explored at length here. However, a few observations are worthwhile.  
The imposition of a carbon levy at the industrial level can be viewed as leading to a  
reduction in emissions through two fundamental channels. The first channel is called  
the input substitution effect. Levying a price on emissions provides an incentive for  
firms to substitute away from emission-intensive inputs and/or to develop less emission- 
intensive technologies. This substitution to lower emission inputs and technologies will,  
it is hoped, reduce emissions. The second channel is called the output effect. Levying a  
price on emissions also raises the marginal costs of production, which in turn leads to a  
reduction in output. This, too, will lower emissions (though there may be carbon leakage  
to other jurisdictions if producers move and produce elsewhere). A carbon levy acts to  
lower emissions through both of these channels. The impact of these two channels on the 
4 The acronym can make or break a policy. For those of a certain generation, the acronym CCR no doubt evokes fond 
memories of Creedence Clearwater Revival; I suspect this was not the panel’s intention.
3emissions of industrial emitters, and the effectiveness of carbon pricing in lowering 
emissions in general, depends on several factors, one of which is the ability of these firms 
to substitute away from carbon-intensive inputs and technologies.
The implicit output subsidy embedded in the CCR can be viewed as reducing the output 
effect for vulnerable sectors. Vulnerable in this context means carbon-intensive and trade-
exposed.5 In other words, there is legitimate concern that imposing a carbon levy on these 
sectors would have significant negative effects on the competitiveness of important sectors 
in the Alberta economy. The imposition of a levy on emissions could cause these firms to 
reduce existing output and employment, lower investment, or possibly even move elsewhere 
(leading to concerns over carbon leakage). By providing an implicit output subsidy to these 
exposed sectors, the CCR can be thought of as blunting the output effect. This means that 
the input substitution effect is left to do the heavy lifting in terms of emission reductions 
in sectors that receive the implicit output subsidy. It also means that more is required from 
other sectors in the economy, including final consumers, if emissions are to be stemmed.
HOW MUCH REVENUE?
The approximately $3 billion in revenues generated by the carbon levy referred to in the 
report, and in much of the public discussion, is net revenue, after the implicit output subsidy 
is provided to large emitters.6 The report does not provide details on the size of implicit 
subsidy to large emitters; to determine this, one must work backwards from the net revenue 
figure provided and make assumptions regarding emissions subject to the broad pricing 
regime.
One can make some back-of-the-envelope calculations in this regard.7 In 2013, stationary 
plus transport CO2 emissions in Alberta were 196.2 megatonnes. Applying a carbon price 
of $30 per tonne, this would generate gross revenues, prior to the implicit output subsidy for 
large producers, of $5.886 billion. Net revenue of $3 billion therefore suggests an implicit 
output subsidy of $2.886 billion to large emitters. Of course, these are rough calculations, as 
emissions in 2018 will be higher and assumptions had to be made regarding the coverage of 
the levy; however, they are likely to be in the right ballpark.
While the impact of a carbon levy on the competitiveness of key Alberta sectors is clearly 
an important consideration, it is not immediately obvious that an implicit output subsidy of 
$2.886 billion targeted at large emitters is the best way to address it. In principle, one might 
therefore view the gross revenue of $5.886 billion as being on the table, with output-based 
allocations to large emitters as just one possible use of the money. However, an in-depth 
analysis of this awaits further consideration. In what follows, I will take the implicit output 
subsidy for large emitters as given and consider the issue of revenue neutrality within the 
context of the net revenue of $3 billion.
5 See the report, 34-35.
6 It is also net revenue in the sense that the carbon levy is envisaged as being a deductible cost in calculating oilsands 
royalties and corporate income tax. As a result, revenue from these other sources will decline.
7 Credit goes to my colleague, Trevor Tombe, for providing these numbers.
4What does the report say should be done with the $3 billion? Not much. The report 
recommends that the money be used in four ways:
1. To offset impacts on low- and middle-income households by providing them with a 
consumer rebate;
2. To support transition of workers and communities to enable full inclusion of aboriginal 
communities in climate change mitigation and adaptation;
3. To double down on additional carbon emissions by investing in complementary policies 
and encourage technological innovation;
4. To provide incremental fiscal capacity for other government priorities, be they 
infrastructure spending, tax reductions, deficit reductions or other programs.
The first two uses of the revenue address distributional concerns associated with the 
imposition of the carbon levy. While the distributional impact of a carbon levy is a 
matter of some dispute,8 taking steps to protect groups disproportionately affected seems 
reasonable. Most studies show that these initiatives account for a small fraction of the 
carbon revenues raised.9
Clearly, the last point – the generation of incremental fiscal capacity for other government 
priorities – provides substantial wiggle room. I will argue below that all, or substantially 
all, of the $3 billion in net revenue generated by the carbon levy should be used to reduce 
existing taxes, and that complementary emission-reduction policies, programs to encourage 
green technological innovation, infrastructure and any other related government priorities, 
should be considered, justified and financed independently of the revenues raised from the 
carbon levy.
THE ARGUMENTS FOR REVENUE NEUTRALITY
The meaning of the term “revenue neutrality” in the context of a carbon levy would appear 
to be straightforward: the revenue generated by the carbon levy is used to lower existing 
taxes, generating no new net revenue for the government.
While this is the straightforward and, one would think, universally held meaning of the 
term, the Alberta government has managed to come up with a different, and unique, 
definition. Premier Rachel Notley, in her speech announcing the report’s release, said:
We will put every penny raised through the carbon price to work here in Alberta —  
building our economy, creating jobs, and doubling down on efforts to reduce pollution  
and promote greater efficiency. The Alberta carbon price will therefore be revenue  
neutral, fully recycled back into the Alberta economy. To that end, revenue will  
be reinvested directly into measures to reduce pollution — including clean research 
8 
For alternative views, see Bohringer et al (2016), Rivers (2012), and Lee and Sanger (2008).
9 
See, for example, Rivers (2012). Ecofiscal Commission (2016), 19, calculates that 9.5 per cent of carbon levy revenues would 
be needed to fully insulate the first and second income quintiles from the carbon levy.
5and technology, green infrastructure like public transit, to help finance the transition 
to renewable energy, and efficiency programs to help people reduce their energy use. 
[Emphasis added.]
Premier Notley has been widely, and rightly, criticized for this rather creative definition 
of revenue neutrality. The B. C. government certainly understood the concept. The B.C. 
carbon tax is levied at a rate of $30 per tonne and has relatively broad coverage. In 2013-
2014, the tax generated $1.212 billion in revenue. The B.C. carbon tax was designed to be 
revenue neutral, with all of the tax revenue recycled back to taxpayers by way of reductions 
in existing taxes. Of the $1.212 billion in revenue raised, $522 million was used to reduce 
personal income taxes, primarily through a reduction in tax rates on the first two income 
brackets and by way of the Low Income Climate Action Tax Credit; $710 million was used 
to reduce corporate income taxes, primarily through a one-percentage-point reduction in 
the provincial corporate income tax rate for both large and small businesses.10
My concern here is to lay out the arguments for using the revenue from the Alberta carbon 
levy to reduce existing taxes in a revenue-neutral manner given the standard meaning of the 
term.
To begin, it is important to understand the full economic costs associated with taxes. The 
key point is that a tax will typically impose costs on the economy over and above the 
revenue it raises. These additional costs are referred to as the efficiency costs of the tax.11 
The reason for this is that taxes distort market prices, causing consumers and producers to 
alter their behaviour. In the case of an excise tax imposed on a good or service, for example, 
the imposition of a tax raises the price paid by buyers and lowers the price received by 
sellers, causing buyers and sellers to consume and produce less than they otherwise would. 
The tax distorts their economic decisions, making them worse off, and therefore generating 
costs over and above the tax revenue raised. 
Despite these efficiency costs, it is clear that we need taxes to raise the revenue that 
governments need, to do the things they need to do (and some things they don’t need to 
do). However, this suggests that policy decisions in this regard should be informed by the 
efficiency costs associated with various taxes. One way to do this is to employ the concept 
of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). The MCF of a tax measures the total cost to 
the economy of raising one more dollar in revenue from that tax. The MCF consists of the 
$1 in revenue raised plus the efficiency costs associated with raising that $1. The presence 
of efficiency costs means that the MCF of most taxes is greater than the $1 in incremental 
revenue raised.
One way of thinking about the efficiency costs of a tax is to consider what happens to 
the base upon which a tax is applied when that tax is increased. For example, say the 
government increases the size of a tax by 10 per cent and the private sector responds by 
reducing the amount of the taxed activity by two per cent; in other words, the tax base 
shrinks by two per cent. In this case, tax revenue will increase by eight per cent due to the 
behavioural response of taxpayers, which is less than the 10 per cent increase in the tax 
10 The personal and corporate income tax reductions credited to the carbon tax revenue actually slightly exceeded the revenue 
from the carbon tax by about $20 million.
11 
Efficiency costs are also referred to as the deadweight loss or excess burden of the tax.
6rate. Because the 10 per cent increase in the tax results in only an eight per cent increase in 
tax revenue, the total cost of raising a marginal dollar of tax revenue is approximately 10/8, 
or $1.25; the MCF in this case is 1.25.12 
That additional 25 cents, over and above the $1 in incremental tax revenue raised, is the 
efficiency cost associated with raising an additional dollar of tax revenue. It arises because 
the size of the tax base shrinks due to the behavioural effects associated with the increase 
in the tax rate. The sensitivity of the tax base to the tax rate will differ across different 
types of taxes. All else being equal, the more sensitive a tax base is to an increase in the tax 
rate, (the more the tax base shrinks in response to an increase in the tax rate), the higher 
will be the efficiency cost of the tax and the higher the MCF.
In two recent very valuable and timely School of Public Policy research papers, Bev Dahlby 
and Ergete Ferede calculate the tax base sensitivities and the MCF of the three major types 
of taxes in Canadian provinces: corporate income taxes (CIT), personal income taxes (PIT), 
and general sales taxes (GST).13 Their calculations are reproduced in Table 1. I focus here 
on the calculations for Alberta, and in particular on the implications of these calculations 
for the argument for the revenue neutrality of carbon taxes.
The MCF for the CIT for Alberta is 3.79. This means that if Alberta increased its statutory 
CIT rate to raise an incremental dollar in revenue, and the tax rates in the other provinces 
remained the same, this would impose an additional, and somewhat astonishing, $2.79 in 
costs on the Alberta economy over and above the incremental $1 in tax revenue raised, due 
to the efficiency costs arising from the shrinkage in the corporate tax base. This is due in 
large part to the sensitivity of the corporate tax base to changes in the tax rate. Dahlby and 
Ferede estimate that a one-percentage-point increase in the statutory CIT rate for Alberta is 
associated with about a 13 per cent decrease in the corporate tax base.
At 1.71, the MCF for the PIT is smaller, but still significant. Raising one more dollar in 
revenue by increasing the personal income tax rate generates an incremental $0.71 in 
economic costs. Notably, the MCF for a general sales tax in Alberta is 1.0. The reason 
for this is that Alberta does not levy a general sales tax, which means that at the margin, 
raising an incremental dollar in revenue from a sales tax imposes no additional costs on 
the economy. This is the typical argument for imposing a sales tax in Alberta (another 
argument for another day).
12 
This example is taken from Dahlby and Ferede (2011). As they point out, it is an approximation because the 10 per cent 
increase in the tax is not literally a marginal increase as it will generate more than $1. Technically, an infinitesimal increase 
in the tax is required. See Dahlby (2008) for a more rigorous treatment.
13 
Dahlby and Ferede (2016a, 2016b).
7TABLE 1 THE MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS FOR THE PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
 
 
Marginal Cost of Public Funds
(1) (2) (3)
Corporate Income Tax Personal Income Tax General Sales Tax
British Columbia 3.19 2.86 ---
Alberta 3.79 1.71 1.00
Saskatchewan *** 2.38 1.41
Manitoba 4.70 2.42 1.34
Ontario 5.21 6.76 ---
Quebec 3.62 3.05 1.92
New Brunswick *** 1.91 1.42
Nova Scotia *** --- 1.62
Prince Edward Island *** 2.80 2.44
Newfoundland & Labrador *** 2.16 1.57
NOTE: The MCF calculations are for 2013 from Dahlby and Ferede (2016a) for all provinces except for Alberta, where 
the figures have been updated to reflect the recent increase in CIT and PIT in 2016, as reported in Dahlby and Ferede 
(2016b). *** indicates that a tax rate increase would reduce the long-run total tax revenues. --- indicates that the MCF 
could not be computed because the semi-elasticity could not be estimated. 
An important point to note about the MCF is that it is symmetric to tax increases and 
decreases: while an incremental increase in a tax imposes additional efficiency costs 
on the economy, costing the economy more than the incremental dollar in tax revenue 
raised, a decrease in a tax benefits the economy by more than the one dollar in tax revenue 
forgone. Moreover, differences in the MCF associated with different taxes gives rise to the 
possibility of efficiency-enhancing revenue-neutral tax swaps, reducing taxes with a high 
MCF and replacing the revenue by increasing taxes with a low MCF.14
While most taxes give rise to efficiency costs, taxes imposed on externalities, such as 
carbon taxes, are typically viewed as enhancing efficiency by aligning the private costs 
faced by individuals and firms using fossil fuels with the social costs, so that the gains from 
trade properly reflect both the private and social costs. That is, carbon taxes also generate 
efficiency benefits. 
Herein lies the argument for using the proceeds from a carbon levy to lower existing 
taxes. In its strongest form, the argument is often framed in terms of the so-called “double 
dividend” hypothesis. This hypothesis postulates that imposing a carbon tax and recycling 
the revenue in a revenue-neutral manner by lowering existing distortionary taxes generates 
two benefits, or dividends. The first dividend is the benefit associated with the reduction in 
the costs imposed on society from the overuse of carbon-based fuels. The second dividend 
is the decline in the efficiency costs associated with a reduction in the use of existing 
distortionary taxes. Thus, it would appear that imposing a carbon tax and recycling the 
revenue by lowering existing taxes results in a win-win scenario – we improve both the 
environment and the efficiency of the tax system.
To make the idea more concrete, consider, for example, the introduction of a very small 
carbon tax which generates an incremental $1 in revenue for the government. As indicated 
14 
This is discussed in a different context by Dahlby and Ferede (2016a), who point out that the high MCF associated with the 
CIT suggests scope for an efficiency-enhancing revenue-neutral change in the tax mix away from the highly distortive CIT 
and towards less costly taxes, most particularly a sales tax.
8above, the tax will lead to behavioural changes on the part of consumers and producers 
as they use less fossil fuel, and society will benefit from a reduction in the associated 
externalities. This is the first dividend. If the $1 in tax revenue is then simply returned to 
consumers/taxpayers in a lump sum manner, that would be the end of it. While society 
benefits from the reduction in the externalities caused by carbon usage, generating the first 
dividend, because the government takes $1 away with one hand and gives it back with the 
other by way of a non-distortionary lump sum transfer, there is no second dividend. 
However, because most taxes give rise to costs over and above the tax revenue raised, an 
alternative approach would be to return the incremental $1 in revenue from the carbon 
tax to taxpayers by way of a reduction in an existing distortionary tax; for example, the 
provincial CIT. In other words, undertake a revenue-neutral tax swap, replacing $1 in 
tax revenue from the CIT with $1 in tax revenue from the carbon tax. Using Dahlby’s 
and Ferede’s MCF calculations, reducing provincial CIT revenues by $1 will generate 
an additional benefit of $2.79 in reduced efficiency costs over and above the $1 in tax 
revenue given up; this $2.79 is the second dividend. This reasoning would seem to suggest 
that recycling carbon taxes in a revenue-neutral manner, reducing existing distortionary 
taxes dollar for dollar, gives rise to the fabled free lunch – we can have our cake (a better 
environment) and eat it, too (a less distortionary, more efficient tax system).
It turns out, however, that this view is somewhat oversimplified, and most analytical and 
numerical studies of the issue conclude that a double dividend is unlikely to be realized in 
practice.15 While the first dividend – the benefits of mitigating climate change – is not in 
dispute, the second dividend – an improvement in the overall efficiency of the tax system – 
is questionable. In the above example, it was assumed that the MCF associated with raising 
$1 with a carbon tax was simply $1; in other words, there was no incremental efficiency 
cost associated with the carbon tax. It turns out that this is not the case. The reason for this 
is that carbon taxes exacerbate the efficiency costs associated with existing distortionary 
taxes, potentially (and indeed likely) rendering the second dividend negative, and increasing 
the overall efficiency costs of the tax system, even if the revenue is fully recycled in a 
revenue-neutral manner. This is often referred to as the tax interaction effect.
One way of thinking about the tax interaction effect is as follows. Carbon taxes cause the 
costs and prices of products that use energy to rise. This results in effects that are similar 
to an increase in existing taxes on labour and capital, which discourages labour supply 
and investment, thereby exacerbating the efficiency costs associated with the existing 
tax distortions in labour and capital markets. Consider the labour market. The rise in the 
prices of goods and services due to the carbon tax results in a reduction in real wages, as 
the amount of goods and services that a consumer can purchase declines due to higher 
prices. This reduction in real wages has a similar impact to an increase in the tax on labour 
income, which lowers after-tax wages directly, and therefore increases the efficiency costs 
associated with existing taxes on labour income. Thus, in some ways, the carbon tax acts 
like an increase in the tax rate on labour income (actually, it is worse, as I will argue 
below), with an associated rise in efficiency costs.
15 I do not go into the details of individual studies here. For surveys of the literature and more in-depth analysis, see Goulder 
(1995), Parry (1995), Bovenberg and Goulder (1998), Bovenberg (1998), and Bovenberg (1999). 
9Aside from certain special cases, which are unlikely to occur in practice, most studies find 
that the efficiency costs associated with the tax-interaction effect dominate the efficiency 
benefits from reducing existing taxes by recycling the environmental tax revenues in a 
revenue-neutral manner. Alas, it seems that there is no such thing as a free lunch after all.
However, while a double dividend in its strong form may be unlikely to exist in practice, 
this does not mean that revenue-neutral recycling by reducing existing tax rates should 
not be pursued. In fact, and importantly, it strengthens the argument in favour of revenue-
neutral tax recycling. Given that a carbon tax will exacerbate the efficiency costs associated 
with existing distortionary taxes, the best way to mitigate these costs is to lower existing 
tax rates. Indeed, study after study shows that recycling the revenue in this manner 
dominates the use of the revenue in virtually any other manner, and most certainly by way 
of lump sum distributions or transfers.16
The MCF calculations by Dahlby and Ferede suggest that the greatest efficiency gains in 
the tax system would be realized by first allocating revenue from the carbon tax to the 
highly distortive CIT. Reductions in the CIT would also help alleviate the impact of the 
carbon tax on the competitiveness of corporations which are not eligible for the implicit 
output subsidy. It should be stressed, however, that the fact the MCF associated with the 
CIT is higher than other taxes, in particular the PIT, does not mean that all of the carbon 
tax revenue should be devoted to CIT reductions. The MCF calculations are made at the 
margin – they are the total cost savings associated with lowering a tax by $1. Reducing 
corporate taxes by millions, and potentially billions, of dollars is not marginal. As the CIT 
rate declines, so, too, will the MCF associated with further reductions. Indeed, as the CIT 
declines, eventually the MCF associated with another incremental reduction in the CIT rate 
may fall below the PIT (this is currently the case in Ontario, for example; see Table 1).
While it is well beyond the scope of this note to attempt to ascertain any sort of optimal 
allocation of the revenue from a carbon tax across the different taxes, the MCF calculations 
suggest that devoting a significant proportion of the revenue to reductions in the CIT in 
Alberta is reasonable from an efficiency perspective. Indeed, the B. C. government devotes 
over half (58 per cent in 2013/2014) of the revenue from its carbon tax to CIT reductions. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the MCF associated with the PIT is also quite high. This 
suggests the desirability of lowering personal taxes as well.
BUT SURELY, THERE ARE OTHER THINGS WE CAN DO WITH THE REVENUE?
Of course there are. Indeed, the possibilities of using this new-found money seem almost 
limitless. The report provides some rather vague recommendations in this regard, including 
the creation of incremental fiscal capacity for the government to pursue “other priorities.” 
But from the previous discussion, it should now be clear that this is not found money at all; 
it comes with a cost.17
16 Ibid.
17 
See Ecofiscal Commission (2016), for an alternative discussion of what to do with carbon tax revenue. For reasons 
elaborated below, my view differs in some respects from the perspective taken in that report. 
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Several points are relevant in this regard. First, it is possible in principle that some public 
expenditures will generate higher returns to society than decreasing existing distortionary 
taxes. However, it is important to remember that a carbon levy will exacerbate existing 
tax distortions. Devoting the revenue to a reduction in pre-existing distortionary taxes 
is required to mitigate this increase in the inefficiency of the tax system. Further, any 
public expenditure financed by the revenue from the carbon levy needs to pass the cost-
benefit threshold suggested by the MCF calculations. For example, using the MCF for 
the provincial CIT, any public expenditure financed at the margin with an incremental $1 
from a carbon levy needs to generate at least $2.79 in social benefits over and above the 
tax revenue raised, to render it a better use of the funds than a CIT reduction. Since the 
introduction of a carbon levy actually increases the efficiency costs of existing taxes, an 
incremental investment would need to generate a social return even greater than this. If 
this is not the case, the money would be better allocated to a reduction in the CIT rate. It is 
incumbent upon proponents of using carbon tax revenue for these other purposes to provide 
a justification along these lines. This reasoning applies to everything from doubling down 
on complementary policies to reduce emissions, to financing the development of green 
technologies, to “incremental fiscal capacity for other government priorities, including 
infrastructure.”
An even stronger point can be made. If the government does wish to devote resources to 
these purposes, or to any other priority areas, financing them by way of a carbon levy is 
not the best way to do it. The reason for this is that carbon taxes are, as discussed above, a 
relatively inefficient way to raise revenue. Due to the tax interaction effect, the economic 
cost of raising a dollar through a carbon tax is higher than that of raising a dollar through 
other taxes, such as a sales tax or even a broadly applied increase in the personal income 
tax. The reason for this is that a carbon tax is applied to a much narrower base – to 
individual commodities (such as fossil fuels) or on emissions from particular industries 
– than broader-based taxes. As a result, carbon taxes tend to imply larger distortions in 
markets for intermediate inputs, for consumer goods, and for labour and capital. Swapping 
a carbon tax for other distortionary taxes limits (but does not eliminate) these distortions. 
If the government wants to double down on expenditures to improve the environment, 
to finance infrastructure, or any other priority area, by all means go ahead, but the 
expenditures should be justified on cost-benefit grounds and financed with taxes that 
generate lower efficiency costs than a carbon levy (a sales tax comes to mind).
This argument also applies to the elephant in the room that I have not yet addressed: the 
current fiscal crisis. To cut to the chase, how can I even suggest using the revenue from the 
carbon tax to lower existing taxes when the government is faced with a sizable and looming 
fiscal deficit? Shouldn’t we just use the revenue generated by the carbon levy to lower the 
deficit? The answer to this question should now, hopefully, be clear. If we want to address 
the deficit by generating more revenue, and I am not suggesting that we do, then we should 
do it in the most efficient manner possible. For the reasons discussed above, that would not 
be a carbon tax.
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The purpose of this note is to present the economic case for making the Alberta carbon 
levy revenue neutral: using the revenue generated by the levy to reduce existing taxes, 
generating no new net revenue for the government. The discussion has focused on the 
projected $3 billion in net government revenue generated by the levy, net of the payment of 
an implicit output-based subsidy to large emitters.
The arguments for revenue neutrality are, in my view, compelling, if not unassailable. 
While pricing carbon is the right approach to dealing with the externalities generated by 
emissions, it comes at a cost. This cost can best be mitigated by using the revenue to lower 
existing distortionary taxes. The cost-benefit bar for using the revenue for other purposes 
is high, and alternative uses of the funds should, at the very least, be justified on these 
grounds. Indeed, there is no compelling reason why the size of government should increase 
in conjunction with the introduction of a carbon levy. If further climate initiatives, or other 
government priorities, such as infrastructure, are desired (and are justifiable on cost-benefit 
grounds), they should be financed in the most efficient way possible, using broad-based 
consumption or income taxes, not by a carbon levy.
In sum, policy should generally reflect the following approach: price emissions 
appropriately, use the revenue to reduce existing taxes in a revenue-neutral manner, 
evaluate the benefits of spending money on other initiatives (complementary emissions 
policies, infrastructure, deficit reduction, community transition, etc.), and finance those 
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